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Congolese soldiers on patrol in North Kivu, November 2013.
Over the past year, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has descended into a political crisis, journalists, activists,
foreign diplomats, and the leaders of international and
nongovernmental organizations have focused mostly on the
drama surrounding President Joseph Kabila’s attempts to
cling to power by delaying elections.
This narrow political focus recalls the outside world’s
approach to Congo the last times the country prepared for
general elections, in 2006 and 2011. Now, as then, the
preoccupation with elections distracts from the issues whose
resolutions are most likely to lead to peace: the poverty,
unemployment, corruption, criminality, and poor access to
land, justice, and education that are at the root of Congo’s
long-standing violence.
Bringing peace and prosperity to Congo will require a change
in attitude, away from the crisis in Kinshasa and toward the
local actors who have the power to address the deeper
sources of the country's troubles.
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CRISIS IN KINSHASA
Free and fair elections are relatively new to Congo. The
country held its first-ever democratic elections in 2006, in a
contest that led to a runoff vote and violence in Kinshasa.
Congolese citizens voted again in 2011, but accusations of
fraud marred the process. Both times, Kabila and his party
took the majority of the votes.
The general elections scheduled for 2016 could have been
different. To start, the constitution barred Kabila from
running for a third term. More important, Congolese people
have been so disappointed with the performance of their
president that, according to one of the only reliable opinion
polls available, they were preparing to vote for his political
opponents.
But the elections have yet to take place. The government has
rescheduled them several times under various pretexts.
Kabila's attempts to stay in power generated massive protests
in September—and, to a lesser extent, in the following
months—which the government violently suppressed.
Opposition figures and grassroots activists were harassed,
threatened, and, at times, arrested, tortured, and killed.
Ordinary people have become wary of discussing elections.
When I was in Congo last summer, most of my contacts would
lower their voices when talking about the political crisis.
Others would look around to make sure nobody was listening.
The end of the year saw a flurry of mediation efforts by the
African Union, the United Nations, and Congo’s influential
Catholic Church. On December 31, the government and a
number of opposition parties finally reached an agreement.
They pledged to form a transitional government under the
leadership of Kabila and a prime minister from the opposition
that would lead the country until general elections could be
held, which would be done no later than the end of 2017.
Neither of those promises has materialized. The government
claims that it does not have the funds necessary to hold
elections this year, and the transitional government has not
yet been formed. Meanwhile, the opposition is becoming
increasingly divided—a problem that was further complicated
by the death of Etienne Tshisekedi, the country’s most
important opposition leader, in early February.
THE ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE
Even if political change in Kinshasa were to arrive, however,
it would be unlikely to bring peace and prosperity to Congo.
The capital is too disconnected from the rest of the country to
effectively address its problems. Besides, holding general
elections would be unlikely to resolve the many issues that
cause misery for most of the country’s citizens.
Opinion polls conducted by the Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative consistently indicate that peace and security are the
top priorities of most Congolese. Livelihood problems such as
the lack of money, employment, education, and access to food
and land are also of great concern. They are followed by
governance issues, such as justice.
It is possible to promote peace and prosperity despite
Congo’s crisis in government.
Most of the violence in Congo is fueled more by these kinds of
problems than by the crisis in national politics. (Though some
of the ongoing fighting—for instance, the recent clashes in
Kinshasa and Bas Congo—is clearly linked to electoral
matters.) As I argued in an essay in Foreign Affairs in 2008
(and later in a book, The Trouble with the Congo), local
matters motivate large parts of the persistent conflicts in
Congo’s eastern provinces. Those conflicts have been
exacerbated by rebel groups from Congo’s
neighbors—notably Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda—that have
taken refuge in Congo and have often allied with local and
national power brokers to pursue their own agendas.
In the midst of widespread violence, there can be no
meaningful freedoms of expression or movement, nor can
there be many of the other conditions that free and fair
elections require. And when there are criminals and rebels on
whom governing elites can blame disappearances and
murders, it is easier for the ruling class to oppress its
opponents. This is how the ongoing violence impedes the
resolution of the political crisis in Kinshasa.
According to the Congo Research Group, nearly half of
Congolese people believe that their country’s electoral
process, security issues, and economic problems are
inextricably linked. They are right to think so. Consider
poverty. On the island of Idjwi in Lake Kivu, which has been
mostly insulated from the violence of the surrounding
province of South Kivu, young people I met while conducting
academic research last summer threatened to take up arms
against local elites in an attempt to attract international
attention, and thus income-generating projects, to their
island. In the nearby town of Kavumu, on Sud Kivu’s
mainland, Congolese I spoke with told me they wanted access
to development programs that would employ young people
and keep them from joining armed groups. Of course,
violence prevents many development initiatives from
succeeding in the first place, creating a vicious cycle.
The current political crisis has the potential to exacerbate all
these issues. For good reason, Congolese citizens worry that
the run-up to elections may generate additional violence—for
instance, between protesters and the police or the army—and
thus make their everyday lives even more difficult. The
countdown to elections is also likely to worsen community
tensions, because politicians are mobilizing their bases by
promising them land, money, and jobs, pitting them against
their opponents’ supporters.
The best way to resolve these matters would be to install a
national government that represents Congolese citizens and
focuses on peace and development. But the negotiations in
Kinshasa and the elections they may eventually produce are
unlikely to lead to that outcome. There is little hope that
elections, if they are held, will be free and fair, and the
overwhelming majority of the elite jockeying for power place
their own wealth and influence above the interests of their
fellow citizens. The good news is that it is possible to promote
peace and prosperity in Congo despite the country's political
crisis.
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Playing the guitar on Idjwi, November 2016.
A BETTER WAY
Activists, diplomats, and development workers usually try to
address tensions in war and postwar contexts by supporting
national elites and relying on foreign actors and external
expertise. This approach has repeatedly failed in Congo, and
at times it has even worsened the situation. As international
interveners have emphasized sexual violence as one of the
main consequences of the conflict in Congo, for example,
some combatants have committed rapes in order to attract
international attention and push the government to the
negotiating table.
There is a better way forward. In some parts of Congo,
citizens have managed to address violence and poverty on
their own—for example, by turning to local religious
authorities or community organizations to mediate disputes,
instead of to militias or the security forces. If international
and nongovernmental organizations want to help fix Congo’s
problems, they should focus on backing these kinds of
successful peacebuilding initiatives rather than concentrating
almost exclusively on challenges such as troubled elections.
Foreign interveners should fund, protect, and otherwise
support exceptional individuals and organizations much more
extensively. Local people have far more relevant knowledge,
contacts, and means to resolve their own predicaments than
outsiders usually believe they do—and more than provincial,
national, and international actors will ever have. Moreover,
ordinary Congolese trust traditional authorities much more
than they trust national leaders, even when those local elites
were not chosen democratically.
Good outcomes such as democracy and peace do not always
arrive together.
Getting to peace will require a change in attitude. To start,
international interveners should acknowledge that bottom-up
processes can be at least as effective at creating peace as top-
down approaches are, if not more so. Building peace,
democracy, and prosperity from the grassroots is a necessary
complement to the ongoing efforts to resolve the crisis in
Kinshasa.
Next, outside groups should recognize that good outcomes
such as democracy and peace do not always arrive together.
In fact, the push toward political liberalization has fueled
violence in a number of other postwar countries, from Angola
and Bosnia to Cambodia and El Salvador. In the short term,
there may be a similar tradeoff between democracy and peace
in Congo. Elections could be organized as quickly as possible,
with the understanding that doing so may fuel violence.
Alternatively, the time, resources, and effort required to
organize elections could be used to address the root causes of
Congo’s conflict. Foreign activists and diplomats should not
be the ones to choose between these courses. Instead,
ordinary Congolese should. Diplomats, peacekeepers, and the
staff members of international and nongovernmental
organizations can certainly help. But to do so, they must look
beyond elections to the local sources of Congo’s problems. 
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